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Abstract
This paper presents a new method for specifying and analyzing cryptographic protocols. Our method
oers several advantages over previous approaches.
Our technique is the rst to allow reasoning about nonmonotonic protocols. These protocols
are needed for systems that rely on the deletion of information. There is no idealization step in
specifying protocols; we specify at a level that is close to the actual implementation. This avoids
errors that might otherwise render a specication that passes the analysis, useless in practice.
In our method, knowledge and belief sets for each principal are modied via actions and inference
rules. Every message is considered to be broadcast, and we introduce the update function to
maintain global knowledge. We show how our method uncovers the known aw in the Needham
and Schroeder protocol [11], and that the revision by the same authors [12] does not contain this
aw. We also show that our method correctly handles protocols that are trivially insecure, such as
Nessett's noted example. [13]
We then apply our method to our khat protocol [14]. The analysis reveals a serious, previously
undiscovered aw in our nonmonotonic protocol for long-running jobs; one that seems obvious in
hindsight, but escaped the attention of the authors and over 300 USENIX conference attendees.
In addition, our analysis reveals a previously unknown vulnerability in phase II of khat. These are
stunning conrmations of the importance of tools for analyzing cryptographic protocols.
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1 Introduction
In computer networks, communicating parties
must share a set of rules describing the mes-
sages they will send and receive. These rules,
or protocols, are the foundation on which mod-
ern networks are built. As protocols are nec-
essary to establish any useful communication,
standard sets of rules are published and made
widely available. This allows users all over
the world to communicate with each other and
share information on networks such as the In-
ternet.
Unfortunately, the availability and
widespread knowledge of communication pro-
tocols has also facilitated the malicious inter-
ference of active intruders on the network. To
combat this, cryptographic protocols that rely
on the encryption of data were developed. It
is widely accepted that the security of data in
networks should rely on the underlying cryp-
tographic technology, and that the protocols
should be open and available. [18] However,
many protocols have been found to be vulnera-
ble to attacks that do not require breaking the
encryption, but instead manipulate the mes-
sages in the protocol to gain some advantage.
The advantages potentially gained by an at-
tacker range from the compromise of conden-
tiality to the ability to impersonate another
user.
Analysis techniques have been developed to
help discover aws in protocols before they are
trusted. Flaws were discovered in such well
known protocols as the Needham and Schroed-
ers key distribution protocol [5] and the CCITT
X.509 protocol [2]. The BAN logic of Burrows,
Abadi, and Needham [2] and its descendents
[3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 15], have been pivotal in the abil-
ity to use knowledge and belief in the analysis
of cryptographic protocols to discover aws.
All of the logics developed to date reason
monotonically. That is, once something is
known, it is always known. This fact has been
a fundamental obstacle in providing a complete
logic because negation is missing. This means
that there are valid formulas that cannot be de-
rived. There have been two attempts to remedy
this. Abadi and Tuttle [1] provide a semantics
for the BAN logic that includes a new construct
for negation. Moser [10] provides a nonmono-
tonic logic of belief. However, neither of these
deal with nonmonotonicity of knowledge. The
dierence between nonmonotonicity of knowl-
edge and nonmonotonicity of belief is discussed
in Section 3.
At the Center for Information Technology
Integration (CITI), we are researching a new
method for analyzing protocols. This is the
rst method proposed for reasoning nonmono-
tonically about knowledge in cryptographic
protocols. Our approach is a variation on the
protocol specication techniques of Woo and
Lam [19] where each principal's actions are de-
ned separately. In addition, we do not require
protocol idealization, and thus avoid many of
its associated pitfalls as described by Mao and
Boyd. [9] The notation we use is based on the
original BAN logic [2], and we use a similar
reasoning mechanism.
We show how our new method can be
used to specify and analyze the Needham and
Schroeder protocol. We then use it to analyze
the khat protocol [14], which uses nonmono-
tonicity of knowledge, and we show that no
other analysis techniques can be used to ana-
lyze this protocol. Finally, our method is used
to uncover the aw in a famous protocol pre-
sented by Nessett [13] that he used to demon-
strate a weakness in BAN logic.
2 Protocol Specication in
a Distributed System
A typical protocol specication consists of a list
of messages between principals. For example,
the Needham and Schroeder protocol specica-
tion [11] can be seen in Figure 1. A ! B : M
means that principal A sends message M to
principal B. A protocol designer thus speci-
es a protocol by listing the messages principals
send to each other.
Although such a specication is intuitive, it
does not represent the way a protocol is im-
plemented in a distributed system. In a dis-
tributed network, each principal need be aware
only of his potential role in a protocol. For ex-
ample, in the Needham and Schroeder protocol
presented above, principal S is not concerned
with messages 3, 4 and 5. In addition, there
are calculations and actions (such as decryp-
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1. A! S : A;B;N
a
2. S ! A : fN
a
; B;K
ab
; fK
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K
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g
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3. A! B : fK
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K
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4. B ! A : fN
b
g
K
ab
5. A! B : fN
b
  1g
K
ab
Figure 1: The Needham and Schroeder
protocol specication. Protocols are speci-
ed by a principal name, followed by an arrow and
another principal name, followed by a message.
tion and encryption) performed by principals
during the run of a protocol that are not cap-
tured by the specication.
The need to idealize protocols before analyz-
ing them is a weakness in this form of proto-
col specication. This paper proposes a new
method for specifying protocols that conform
to the distributed system model, one that does
not require idealization.
The model of Woo and Lam [19] assigns roles
to the principals in a protocol and treats them
as independent processes. The actions of the
principals are described with no regard to the
actions of others in the system. Our method
for protocol specication and analysis is based
on this notion.
Specifying protocols as in Figure 1 has an-
other disadvantage. Protocol analysis is seen as
a process separate from the specication. Cur-
rent analysis techniques take a completed spec-
ication as input and attempt to reason about
the completed protocol.
1
For example, Figure
2 is a depiction of the BAN logic. [2]
We suggest that protocol analysis should be
integrated with the specication process. Thus,
as a protocol is developed, beliefs and states of
knowledge that represent the current state of
the system are updated. At any point, an in-
consistency can be detected. This has the ad-
vantage of identifying potential causes of prob-
lems as well as the actual aws. When a proto-
1
A notable exception is the NRL Protocol Analyzer
by Syverson and Meadows [16]. However, this system
is not modeled after the BAN type of reasoning about
belief and knowledge, but uses the term-rewriting alge-
braic properties of a protocol.
Proceed
Cannot
Idealized Protocol
Formulas attached
to protocol steps
Apply Rule
Protocol Specification Initial Assumptions
Conclusion Reached
Figure 2: Protocol analysis with the BAN
logic. The input to BAN is a protocol specica-
tion and the initial assumptions. At each step, for-
mulas are attached to the protocol messages, and
either a rule is applied, or the logic must halt. If
possible, the desired conclusion is reached.
col has been completely specied, the analysis
is complete as well.
3 Nonmonotonicity of
Knowledge vs. Non-
monotonicity of Belief
With few exceptions, previous work in the ap-
plication of the logic of knowledge and belief
to the analysis of cryptographic protocols has
considered only monotonic reasoning systems.
In these systems, once something is believed, it
is always believed. The same applies for knowl-
edge.
The dierence between knowledge and belief
is subtle. A principal knows that his key is K.
A principal believes that a nonce is fresh. In
general, a principal knows things like secrets
and data; a principal believes meta-data, or in-
formation about the data, such as freshness.
Monotonic systems have trouble reasoning
with incomplete information. A belief that is
assumed in the absence of other information,
can be nullied by the introduction of new in-
formation. However, a monotonic system has
no mechanism to do this. In fact, most previ-
ous systems have no refutation. The ability to
2
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Figure 3: The denition of Moser's unless
operator. The x in the last row indicates a spe-
cial case. x is true i 9r : B
i
(p) unless B
i
(r) 2 F ,
where F is a conjunction of formulas containing the
unless operator.
refute beliefs is important for reasoning about
protocols. For example, if a session key is com-
promised, we need to change our belief that this
is a good key.
Moser [10] gives a nonmonotonic logic of be-
lief. This logic is biased towards belief in the
absence of information. Thus, a nal inter-
pretation of a formula is believed unless there
is some information that makes it inconsis-
tent. The logic uses a construct called unless to
achieve this. The value of a formula using un-
less can be seen from the truth table in Figure 3
(where F is a conjunction of formulas contain-
ing the unless operator and B
i
(p) means that
principal i believes p). The x in the last row is
a special case and is dened as follows:
x =
8
<
:
t if 9r : B
i
(p) unless B
i
(r) 2 F
and B
i
(r) is true
f otherwise
The logic of Moser suers from intractabil-
ity. In addition, the logic deals only with non-
mononicity of belief. There is no known reason-
ing system that deals with the nonmonotonicity
of knowledge. A situation where such reasoning
applies is a protocol that requires a principal
to no longer possess information it previously
knew. This is dierent from a principal not
believing a statement it previously believed.
The khat protocol [14], described in Section
4, is an example of a protocol that requires
reasoning with nonmonotonicity of knowledge.
The protocol relies on a public workstation
\forgetting" some information. The BAN logic,
along with its extensions, does not provide a
way for representing this behavior.
In this paper, we introduce a method for an-
alyzing protocols such as khat, where informa-
tion is erased and no longer known by a prin-
cipal. Our method uses observers sets for each
secret that contain the principals who know
it. These are similar to the knowledge sets of
Kailar et al. [8] However, Kailar et al. use these
sets to reason about belief, whereas we apply
the concept in a slightly dierent way to reason
about the nonmonotonicity of knowledge.
4 The KHAT protocol
The khat system of Rubin and Honeyman [14]
was built to solve the problem of long running
jobs in an authenticated environment where a
trusted server issues tickets with limited life-
times for services. Khat stands for Kerberized
at, and is based on the UNIX at command.
When using this service, a user schedules a job
for a future time and date, with the option of
renewing tickets until the job completes.
When a user submits a khat job, the program
creates a spool le containing everything nec-
essary to run the job at a later date, such as
environment variables, and sends it to the khat
server. The server stores the spool le for the
job, and the user's workstation erases it from
memory. The khat client generates a new key,
N , which is used to encrypt the secret key, K,
that will serve as the session key when it is time
for the job to run, and the server and client
need to communicate. N is also stored by the
server and erased by the client. The process
of securing the session key, K on the client is
depicted in Figure 4.
The khat protocol is initiated by the usual
ticket granting method in Kerberos. A ticket
for the khat service is granted to the client af-
ter the initial authentication. This process is
well known and is believed to be secure. Tous-
saint provides a proof that the kerberos ticket
granting protocol is secure. [17] We take the
results of the ticket granting process as the ini-
tial assumptions in our analysis. Thus, the khat
protocol begins after ticket granting completes.
The khat system can be divided into two
phases. Phase I works as follows.
1. A Kerberos ticket for khat is granted to the
client and a session key is established.
3
Rubin
KHAT Server Client
K K
SF
{N}K
N
N
KHAT Server Client
K
SF
KHAT Server Client
K
SF
{K}
{K}
 N
 N
Figure 4: How K is secured on the client
in khat. The rst step is illustrated in the top di-
agram. The spool le, SF is stored by the server,
and the client and server share a secret session key,
K. The client generates a new key, N . Then, as
shown in the next diagram, N is used to encrypt
the session key, K, which remains on the client ma-
chine, while, N is sent to the server, sealed under
the session key. Finally, as shown in the bottom
diagram, K and N are stored on the server. When
it is time for the job to run, N is sent to the client
to unseal fKg
N
.
2. The client generates a spool le for the job.
3. The spool le is sent to the server under
the session key.
4. The server stores the spool le.
5. The client generates a new key, N , sends
fNg
K
to the server, and erases the spool
le and N from its memory.
6. The server stores N .
Phase II occurs when it is time for the job to
run. The server wakes up once a minute to see
if any khat jobs are ready. If so, phase II is
initiated as follows:
1. The server sends N to the client.
2. The server sends the spool le to the client
under the session key, K.
3. The client runs the job.
For a more complete discussion of khat, the
reader is referred to the original paper. [14]
It is clear that this protocol cannot be speci-
ed as a simple list of messages such as in Fig-
ure 1. The specication method we present in
this paper is more appropriate because we can
include steps such as step 5 in Phase I.
The analysis depends on the assumptions in
our threat model. We are concerned with an
active intruder who has access to all network
resources and can intercept, replace or delete
any message. In addition, we are concerned
with vacant workstations and information on
them that can be useful to an intruder. This
threat is also discussed in the khat paper [14].
In that paper, an informal discussion of the se-
curity risks of khat is given. The method we
present here grew out of an attempt to analyze
khatmore formally, and to provide a method for
analysis of any system that must reason about
nonmonotonicity of knowledge.
5 Specifying a Protocol
In this section we provide denitions and no-
tation for specifying a protocol. There are two
types of denitions. Those in the rst type are
global to the protocol, and denitions of the
second type are local to each principal.
To accommodate dierent levels of trust
among principals, we place the beliefs of the
principals in the local sets. If the assumption
were to be made that each principal in the sys-
tem is either trusted by everyone or trusted by
no one, as is the case in many simple authen-
tication systems, then we could have put these
beliefs in the global set. To maintain general-
ity, the level of trust and belief will be local.
Thus, jurisdiction, the ability to assign session
keys, is a belief that must be held by the parties
sharing the keys, but not by everyone else.
The protocol designer may wish to specify
and analyze a protocol for a system with un-
trustworthy principals. We include a trust ma-
trix in the specication where the trust between
4
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each pair of principals is established. This is
explained in Section 5.3.
As pointed out by Mao and Boyd, some
statements in the BAN logic are not intuitive,
such as the notion of believing a key or a nonce.
[9] To remedy this, we dene two local sets.
One set is composed of the items that a prin-
cipal possesses, such as encryption keys and
nonces. The other set contains the principal's
beliefs, such as the freshness of a key, or the
possessions of another principal. Items in the
possession sets are labeled by their origin. Each
possession is accompanied by information that
either states that it was generated by the prin-
cipal himself, or states from whom it was re-
ceived.
We dene actions for dealing with the knowl-
edge in a protocol, and inference rules for rea-
soning about belief. The actions are specied
by the protocol designer and can be chosen
from a specic set of actions dened below.
Inference rules can be added by the designer
although they will usually be the same across
protocols.
5.1 Global Sets
The rst step of the specication of any proto-
col using our method is to instantiate the global
sets with values. It should be noted the con-
tents of these sets change as a protocol run is
simulated in the analysis. The specication of
a protocol is simply the starting point of the
analysis. In this section we give the denitions
of the global sets used for protocol specica-
tion. We introduce W, for world, to represent
all the principals. Also, for each set, the sub-
set n represents its cardinality, but this value
changes from set to set.
Principal Set: This set contains the princi-
pals who participate in a protocol. P =
fP
1
; P
2
;    ; P
n
g. Any P
i
may be marked
as an initiator of the protocol. We will as-
sume there is only one initiator.
Free Variable Set: This set contains vari-
ables that can be instantiated with any
value. FV = fV
1
; V
2
;    ; V
n
g.
Bound Variable Set: This set contains vari-
ables that are bound to certain values.
BV = fX
1
; X
2
;    ; X
n
g.
Rule Set: This set contains inference rules for
deriving new statements from existing as-
sertions. These are the same as the in-
ference rules in the BAN logic. R =
fR
1
; R
2
;    ; R
n
g where R
i
is of the form
C
1
;C
2
;;C
n
D
, C
i
is a condition and D is a
statement.
Secret Set: This set contains all of the secrets
that exist at any given time in the system.
The cardinality of this set changes during
the analysis as new secrets, such as session
keys, are added. S = fS
1
; S
2
;    ; S
n
g.
Observers Sets: For each S
i
, Observers(S
i
)
contains all the principals who could pos-
sibly know the secret S
i
by listening to
network trac or generating it themselves.
The members of the Observers sets can be
stated explicitly or maintained as formulas
representing their membership.
The set, P , contains names of the participants
in a protocol. A typical example might be,
P = fA;B;ASg, where A and B are regular
principals and AS is the authentication server.
Recall that in BAN logic #(X) means that
X is fresh. The set BV contains variables such
as X in the following rule (nonce verication):
P believes #(X); P believes Q said X
P believes Q believes X
The rst occurrence of the variable X can take
on any value. However, the other Xs in the
rule are bound to the value of the rst X once
it is instantiated; so X is in BV . The set FV
contains variables such as the Y in the rule:
ffY g
K
g
K
= Y
Here, Y can take on any value independent of
the rest of the protocol.
An example of the set S is fK
ab
;K
as
;K
bs
g.
This set contains secret keys held among A
and the authentication server, among B and
the authentication server, and a session key
among A and B. The session key would not
be a member of S in a specication where
K
ab
is distributed in the protocol, but would
be added to the set during the analysis at
the point in which it was generated by the
authentication server. This process is dis-
cussed in the analysis section. In this example,
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Observers(K
ab
) = fA;Bg, Observers(K
as
) =
fA; Sg, and Observers(K
bs
) = fB; Sg. Also,
W 2 Observers(K) means that all principals
know K.
5.2 Local Sets
Local sets are private to each principal in a pro-
tocol specication. In this section we dene
these sets. Later, we will show how they are
used in the actual specication and analysis of
a protocol. For each principal, P
i
, we dene
the following sets:
Possession Set(P
i
) This set contains all the
data relevant to security that this prin-
cipal knows or possesses. This includes
secret encryption keys, public keys, data
that must remain secret, and any other in-
formation that is not publicly available.
POSS(P
i
) = fposs
1
; poss
2
;    ; poss
n
g.
poss
i
contains two elds: the actual data
and the origin of the data.
2
Belief Set(P
i
) This set contains all the be-
liefs held by a principal. This includes
the belief that the keys it holds be-
tween itself and other principals are good,
beliefs about jurisdiction, beliefs about
freshness, and beliefs about the posses-
sions of other principals. BEL(P
i
) =
fbel
1
; bel
2
;    ; bel
n
g.
Behavior List(P
i
) This item is a list rather
than a set because the elements are or-
dered. BL = fAL; bvr
1
; bvr
2
;    ; bvr
n
g.
AL is an action list as will be dened be-
low.
Figure 5 shows the structure of BL. The rst
element of BL, is an action list. The remain-
ing elements, bvr
i
, are pairs, (Mess;AL) con-
sisting of a message operation, Mess, and an
action list, AL.
A message operation is one member of
the set fSend(P
j
;msg); Receive(P
j
;msg)g.
Send(P
j
;msg) means that P
i
sends the mes-
sage, msg to P
j
. Similarly, Receive(P
j
;msg)
means that P
i
receives message msg from P
j
.
2
Note that the second eld represents whether or
not P
i
generated the data, or who sent it to P
i
. It does
not represent who originated the data.
BEHAVIOR LIST
action
1
; action
2
; action
3
;   
Message operation
action
1
; action
2
; action
3
;   
Message operation
action
1
; action
2
; action
3
;   
Message operation
action
1
; action
2
; action
3
;   
  
END OF LIST
Figure 5: The structure of a behavior list.
The list contains a list of actions, followed by a
list of pairs, (message operation, action list). After
each action, any relevant inference rules are ap-
plied.
In this case, msg will be marked as coming from
P
j
and added to POSS(P
i
).
In a send operation, msg contains the in-
formation transmitted. In a receive operation
msg contains the elds of the expected mes-
sage. This represents P
i
's expectation about
the structure of the message. This is similar to
the notion of recognizability of the GNY logic.
[7]
An action list is an ordered list of zero or
more actions that are performed by P
i
. Actions
consist of operations such as encryption and
decryption, deletion of information, application
of functions, and the decision whether to abort
the protocol. They are covered in more detail
in section 5.5. Every action is followed by a
check of the inference rules. If the conditions
of a rule are satised as a result of the action,
then the rule is applied. These rules are used
to update the belief sets of the principals.
Action lists play an important role in proto-
col specication. Previous approaches to cryp-
tographic protocol analysis take the actions of
the principals for granted. Operations such as
encryption and decryption are implicit. Our
method makes every action explicit, including
verication that the operations completed suc-
cessfully, and an abort in case they did not.
This method is a better model of protocol ex-
ecution in a real system than previous ap-
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proaches because all of the actions are included
as part of the specication instead of implicitly
assumed.
5.3 The Trust Matrix
Our method does not require that any assump-
tions be made about trust between principals.
Instead, the protocol designer explicitly speci-
es the trust relationship between every pair of
principals. We dene the matrix, TRUST:
TRUST [i; j] =

1 if P
i
trusts P
j
0 if P
i
does not trust P
j
The rows and columns enumerate the princi-
pals in P . Obviously, when i = j, TRUST[i,j]
= 1. P
i
trusts P
j
means that P
i
behaves as
though P
j
will follow the protocol. We give an
example of this using a nonmonotonic protocol.
Say that A believes that B possesses X. Now
say that the protocol requires that B forget
X. As both A and B know the protocol, B
should now remove the belief that B possesses
X from its belief set. However, if B does not
trust A, then he cannot be sure that A actually
no longer possesses X. In the actions described
below, we stipulate the condition that A trusts
B before removing a belief about the posses-
sions of A.
5.4 A Word About Nonces
Message freshness can be guaranteed only with
time-stamps and nonces. Conceptually, a
nonce is a large random number whose purpose
is to link a challenge and a response. If A sends
a nonce, N
a
, to S, then any message including
f(N
a
), for some function f , and encrypted un-
der K
as
, is assumed to be fresh if and only if
the following conditions are satised:
1. No previous message containing f(N
a
) has
been received.
2. K
as
is fresh. That is, we assume K
as
is
known only to A and S.
Our method uses inference rules to propa-
gate belief about freshness. In section 5.5, we
introduce a new construct, LINK(N
a
) to link
a response to a challenge. When a principal
generates a nonce, N
a
, the formula LINK(N
a
)
is added to his belief set. When a message is
received containing, N
a
, the LINK item is re-
moved from the belief set, and all parts of that
message are labeled as being fresh. A reply to
the challenge can be accepted only once. If that
message were to be received again, the absence
of the LINK item in the belief set would hin-
der the conclusion that this message is fresh.
In fact, this is how our analysis technique ex-
poses the weaknesses in protocols vulnerable to
replay attacks. Our analysis of the Needham
and Schroeder protocol (Section 6.1) gives an
example of this.
5.5 Actions
Actions describe how a principal constructs
messages, encrypts and decrypts data, com-
putes functions, aborts a protocol, and per-
forms any other operation. The action lists
that precede and followmessage operations in a
principal's behavior list determine sequence of
events performed by the principal during a pro-
tocol run. As demonstrated below, some of the
actions replace inference rules in the BAN logic,
and others explicitly represent operations that
were taken for granted in previous approaches.
In this section we dene the actions used in
our method, and the following section presents
and discusses the inference rules. Our method
requires some new notation and dispenses with
some previous constructs. As will be shown,
the said, sees, controls, and Q
K
$ P , constructs
of the BAN logic are not needed. The new
denitions follow:
X contains Y means that Y appears as a
submessage of the message X, more for-
mally, for some (possibly null) x
1
; x
2
, X =
x
1
 Y  x
2
.
3
It is always the case that X
contains X.
S := f(S) represents assignment. The value of
S is replaced by the value of the function
f applied to S.
X from P means that X is labeled as having
been received fromP. This will also be true
if P generated X.
3
We adopt the usual convention of  for
concatenation.
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LINK(N
a
) is used to link challenges and re-
sponses. This formula is added to the
belief set of a principal who generates
the nonce N
a
, and allows only one sub-
sequently received message to contain the
nonce N
a
. After such a message is re-
ceived, the formula is removed from the
belief set.
With these new denitions, we now dene the
actions for a given principal, P
i
. Although
not specied in the denitions, we assume that
from labels are inherited in operations. For ex-
ample, if fXg
k
is from Q, and is in POSS(P
i
),
and this is decrypted, then X is also labeled
\from Q" when it is added to POSS(P
i
).
1. Encrypt(X; k)
condition: X; k 2 POSS(P
i
); P
i
2
Observers(k)
result: POSS(P
i
) := POSS(P
i
) [
ffXg
k
g
description: This action is used when a
principal encrypts data. If P
i
pos-
sesses X and knows k then he can
possess fXg
k
.
2. Decrypt(fXg
k
; k)
condition: P
i
2 Observers(k),
fXg
k
; k 2 POSS(P
i
)
result: POSS(P
i
) := POSS(P
i
) [ fXg
description: This action is used when a
principal decrypts data. If P
i
pos-
sesses X, encrypted under k, and P
i
knows k, then P
i
can possess X.
3. Generate-nonce(N)
result: POSS(P
i
) := POSS(P
i
) [ fNg,
BEL(P
i
) := BEL(P
i
) [ LINK(N )
description: This action is used when a
principal generates a nonce to link a
challenge and a response. LINK(N)
is removed from BEL(P
i
) when the
response is received. This is used to
determine freshness.
4. Generate-secret(s)
result: S := S [ fsg, Observers(s) =
fP
i
g, POSS(P
i
) := POSS(P
i
)[fsg,
BEL(P
i
) := BEL(P
i
) [#(s)
description: This action is used when
a principal generates a secret data
item, such as a key. A new secret,
s, is added to S, and the Observers
and possession sets are updated.
5. Concat(X
1
; X
2
;    ; X
n
)
condition: X
1
; X
2
;    ; X
n
2 POSS(P
i
)
result: POSS(P
i
) := POSS(P
i
) [
fX
1
X
2
  X
n
g
description: This action is used when a
principal constructs a message, X,
out of submessages X
1
; X
2
;    ; X
n
.
6. Split(X)
condition: X contains x
1
 x
2
  x
n
,
X 2 POSS(P
i
)
result: POSS(P
i
) := POSS(P
i
) [
fx
1
; x
2
;    ; x
n
g
description: This action is used to break
a message into its components. Split
is the opposite of concatenation.
7. Forget(X)
condition: X 2 POSS(P
i
)
result: POSS(P
i
) := POSS(P
i
)   fXg,
8 P
j
2 P if TRUST [j; i] = 1 then
BEL(P
j
) := BEL(P
j
)   fX 2
POSS(P
i
)g
description: This action is used when P
i
no longer is in possession of X. All
principals who trust P
i
believe that
P
i
no longer possesses X.
8. Forget-secret(s)
condition: P
i
2 Observers(s); s 2
POSS(P
i
)
result: Observers(s) := Observers(s)  
fP
i
g,
POSS(P
i
) := POSS(P
i
)   fsg,
8 P
j
2 P if TRUST [j; i] = 1 then
BEL(P
j
) := BEL(P
j
)   fs 2
POSS(P
i
)g
description: This action is used when P
i
no longer knows the secret s. All
principals who trust P
i
believe that
P
i
no longer possesses s.
9. Apply(f;X)
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condition: f;X 2 POSS(P
i
)
result: POSS(P
i
) := POSS(P
i
) [
ff(X)g
description: This action is used when P
i
applies the function f to X. After
the application, P
i
possesses f(X).
10. Check-freshness(X)
condition: X 2 POSS(P
i
)
result: BEL(P
i
) := BEL(P
i
) [ f#(X)g
description: This action is used to verify
that time-stamp X is fresh.
11. Abort
condition: Protocol run is illegal.
result: Analysis reports failure.
description: This could happen under
various circumstances where there is
an inconsistency or other aw in the
protocol specication.
The dierence between actions such as gener-
ate and actions such as generate-secret is that
items generated as secrets are expected to be
sent encrypted, and others are expected to be
transmitted in the clear at some point. Many
protocols send challenges in the clear; there-
fore, there is no need to maintain these items
as secrets.
The actions described above are used to con-
trol the knowledge and possessions of the prin-
cipals in a protocol. Except for Check-freshness
and abort, all of the actions modify the posses-
sion or Observers sets. Inference rules are used
to modify the belief sets.
The dierence between actions and inference
rules is that actions are explicitly specied as a
part of the protocol. Rules, however, are used
to reason about the beliefs of principals as the
protocol executes. The protocol builder does
not explicitly state how belief evolves in a pro-
tocol, but rather, states the inference rules that
will mechanically control the propagation of be-
lief.
5.6 The Update Function
Before discussing inference rules, we dene an
important function for processing send message
UPDATE(X;W )
if X = NULL then return;
if X = x
1
then
Observers(x
1
) := Observers(x
1
) [
W ;
return;
if X = fY
1
g
k
then
update(Y
1
; Observers(k) \W );
return;
if X = Y
1
 Y
2
then
update(Y
1
;W ); update(Y
2
;W );
return;
END;
Figure 6: The Update function. In this
function, x
1
is a single, unencrypted data el-
ement, such as a nonce or a key. Y
1
and Y
2
are
formulas containing combinations of clear or
encrypted elements such as these. The param-
eter W represents the principals to be added to
the knowledge set of a secret.
operations. When a principal, P
i
sends a mes-
sage to P
j
on the network, any principal can
read it. In our threat model, we view any mes-
sage as being broadcast and available to all. As
pointed out by Nessett, the BAN logic does not
deal with protocols in which a principal pub-
lishes a secret key [13]. (This is discussed in
Section 6.3.) The purpose of the update func-
tion is to update the Observers sets of all se-
crets that are sent on the network. Update is
dened in Figure 6.
If a secret, x
1
, is sent in the clear, then
Observers(x
1
) is set toW to indicate that any
principal now knows x
1
. The union of W with
any set is W.
The initial call after a send operation,
Send(X;P
j
) is Update(X,W). If a submes-
sage, fY g
k
is contained in X, update will re-
curse after it is called. Then, W will con-
tain Observers(k) because only the principals
in this set should be added to the Observers
sets of the elements of Y .
WhenX is of the form fY
1
g
k
, update is called
with Observers(k) \ W . This is because for
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a secret nested in the encryption by dierent
keys, only principals possessing all of the keys
should be added to the Observers set. For ex-
ample, in the call update(ffXg
k
1
g
k2
,W), the
principals added to Observers(X) should be in
both of Observers(k
1
) and Observers(k
2
).
There is a subtle aw in the update function
that we will demonstrate by example and x.
Take update(ffXg
k
1
; k
1
g
k
2
;W). Now, say we
have a principal, P , who is in Observers(k
2
),
but is not in Observers(k
1
). After the function
call, P will be added to Observers(k
1
). How-
ever, P will not be added to Observers(X).
The problem is that update recurses on fXg
k
1
before P is added toObservers(k
1
). To x this,
update is called continuously until no more Ob-
servers sets change. We will assume this im-
plicitly in our protocol specications.
We now give an example (see Figure 7). Take
X = N
a
 fK
ab
; T
s
g
k
1
 fdatag
k
2
. The initial
call is update(N
a
 fK
ab
 T
s
g
k
1
 fdatag
k
2
,W).
This will match the last condition, so update
will now be called twice, update(N
a
,W) and
update(fK
ab
T
s
g
k
1
fdatag
k
2
,W). The rst call
will cause Observers(N
a
) to be W, as desired.
The second call
will further split into two calls, update(fK
ab

T
s
g
k
1
;W) and update(fdatag
k
2
;W). The rst
of these will match the third rule and result in
update(K
ab
 T
s
,Observers(k
1
)). After further
iterations, the principals in Observers(k
1
) will
be added to the Observers sets of K
ab
and T
s
.
Similarly,Observers(data) will be the union of
itself with Observers(k
2
).
5.7 Inference Rules
When using our method, the protocol devel-
oper must choose from the eleven actions de-
ned above. However, as in the BAN logic, he
is given the freedom to specify his own inference
rules. Some rules, such as the nonce verica-
tion rule, will be used by any useful protocol.
In our method, this protocol is specied a bit
dierently.
The nonce verication rule as dened by Bur-
rows et al. [2] is not entirely intuitive. Their
rule is:
P believes #(X); P believes Q said X
P believes Q believes X
It is not clear what it means for Q to believe X,
if X is a nonce. In our method, if P received
X fromQ, then X 2 POSS(P
i
), and X will be
labeled as being from Q. We dene the nonce
verication rule as follows:
#(X) 2 BEL(P ); X from Q 2 POSS(P )
BEL(P ) := BEL(P ) [ fQ believes #(X)g
Thus, P can establish that Q believes that X
is fresh, and this fact is added to P 's belief
set, BEL(P ). Notice that rules are used to
propagate belief during a protocol run, whereas
actions deal with knowledge.
The message meaning rule is dened in BAN
as:
P believes Q
K
$ P, P sees fXg
K
P believes Q said X
This rule states that if P believes that Q and P
share a secret key, K, and P sees X, encrypted
under K, and P did not encrypt X under K,
then P believes that Q once said X. This im-
plies that knowing a principal shares a secret
key with another principal is enough to guar-
antee that any message encrypted under that
key was sent by that principal. In our rule,
this requirement is made explicit. We dene
the message meaning rule as follows:
fXg
k
from Q 2 POSS(P ); fP;Qg  Observers(k)
BEL(P ) := BEL(P ) [ fX 2 POSS(Q)g
This rule states that if fXg
k
was received by
P , from Q, and both P and Q know the key
k, then P believes that Q possesses X. This
is possible because messages are labeled with
their origin when they are added to the pos-
session set. When principal P applies action 2
(decrypt), X will be in his possession set.
Another rule is needed to reason about the
freshness of submessages:
#(x
1
) 2 BEL(P ),
fX contains x
1
; X contains x
2
g  POSS(P )
BEL(P ) := BEL(P ) [#(x
2
)
This rule states that if P believes that x
1
is
fresh, and P possesses a formula containing
both x
1
and x
2
, then P believes that x
2
is
fresh. This rule reects the fact that any part
of a message which contains something fresh, is
fresh.
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W = World
ab k1 k2N  ,  {K    , T}    ,{data}X = a
W = World
a
N X = X =     {K    , T}    ,{data}
ab k1 k2 W = World
:= WorldUObs(N  )
a
Obs(N  )
X = K        
ab X = T    
X =
ab      K     , T
:=Obs(data) Obs(data) U
X =  data 2W = Obs(k  )
2
a
Obs(k  )1
1
1
ab
W =  Obs(k )
W =  Obs(k )W =  Obs(k )
abObs(K   )   :=   Obs(K   )   U Obs(T)  :=   Obs(T)  U Obs(k  )1 Obs(k  )1
Figure 7: The update function. This diagram shows the recursive tree for an example of the
update function. The initial call is update(N
a
 fK
ab
T
s
g
k
1
 fdatag
k
2
,W). Solid rectangles represent
internal nodes on the tree, and the leaves in the rounded rectangles show the action that is taken.
This examples shows how the Observers sets of secrets are updated when a message is sent.
The following rule is the most important in-
ference rule for reasoning about freshness in a
protocol. The only way for a message to be
fresh is for it to contain a valid time-stamp or
a nonce that has never previously been used in
a response. The rule for determining freshness
using a nonce is the linkage rule:
#(k) 2 BEL(P ); P 2 Observers(k);
LINK(N
a
) 2 BEL(P ); X contains f(N
a
);
X contains x
1
; fXg
k
from Q 2 POSS(P )
BEL(P ) := (BEL(P )   LINK(N
a
)) [ f#(x
1
)g
This rule is simpler than its unfortunate length
makes it appear. It is the only rule that can
be used to add information about the freshness
of an item which is not known to contain fresh
submessages, to a principal's belief set.
The linkage rule states that the submessages
of a message X are believed to be fresh under
certain conditions. If LINK(N
a
) is in P 's be-
lief set, then the nonce N
a
has not been used
before. This is the rst condition. If the rule is
applied successfully, the LINK item is removed.
So the rule could not re again for the same
nonce. Other conditions state that the nonce
N
a
must be sealed under a key that is fresh,
and must be available to P .
The rule states that message X must con-
tain f(N
a
) to represent the fact that sometimes
a function of a nonce, rather than the actual
nonce is used to respond to a challenge. The
net result of applying this rule is that any sub-
message of a valid response to a challenge is
believed to be fresh by the recipient of the re-
sponse. Also, there is a guarantee that any re-
play of a valid response will not result in a prin-
cipal believing that the submessages are fresh.
6 Examples
The best way to explain how a protocol is ana-
lyzed using our method is by example. In sec-
tion 6.1, the Needham and Schroeder protocol
is specied, and we step through the analysis.
In section 6.2, we apply our method to the khat
protocol.
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6.1 Needham and Schroeder
First we specify the protocol, and then we show
how our method can be used to analyze it. We
demonstrate that the known aw in the proto-
col exists; principal B cannot achieve the belief
that the session key with A is fresh. Then, we
show how the addition of two messages, as pro-
posed by Needham and Schroeder (in a later
paper [12]) to solve the problem, allows B to
achieve the desired belief.
6.1.1 The Specication
The Needham and Schroeder protocol assumes
that bothA andB trust S. So, the trust matrix
contains 1s in the appropriate spots to repre-
sent this. The trust between A and B is irrel-
evant, and so the matrix values do not matter.
First we dene the global sets. P =
fS;B;Ag. A is marked as the initiator of the
protocol. R contains the rules dened in Sec-
tion 5.7. S = fK
as
;K
bs
g. Each of these secret
keys has an Observers set. Observers(K
as
) =
fA; Sg and Observers(K
bs
) = fB; Sg. Some of
these sets will change once the analysis begins.
Next, we dene the initial values of the local
sets. Notice that initially, principals believe in
the freshness of the key they share with the
server, S. Similarly, the server believes in the
freshness of its shared secret with each princi-
pal. Also, P 1 K
pq
represents the key, K
pq
and
the fact that it is to be used for communicating
with principal P . In this protocol, the function
f subtracts one from its argument.
Principal A
POSS(A) = fK
as
g
BEL(A) = f#(K
as
)g
BL(A) =
 Generate-nonce(N
a
)
Concat(A;B;N
a
)
Send(S; fA B N
a
g)
Update(fA B N
a
g;W)
Receive(S; fN
a
B 1 K
ab
 fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
g
K
as
)
Decrypt(fN
a
B 1 K
ab
 fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
g
K
as
;K
as
)
Split(fN
a
B 1 K
ab
 fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
g)
Send(B; fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
)
Update(fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
;W)
Receive(B; fN
b
g
K
ab
)
Decrypt(fN
b
g
K
ab
;K
ab
)
Send(B;Encrypt(Apply(f;N
b
);K
ab
))
Update(ff(N
b
)g
K
ab
;W)
Principal B
POSS(B) = fK
bs
g
BEL(B) = f#(K
bs
)g
BL(B) =
Receive(A; fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
)
Decrypt(fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
;K
bs
)
Generate-nonce(N
b
)
Send(A,Encrypt(N
b
;K
ab
))
Update(fN
b
g
K
ab
;W)
Receive(A; ff(N
b
)g
K
ab
)
Decrypt(ff(N
b
)g
K
ab
;K
ab
)
Principal S
POSS(S) = fK
as
;K
bs
g
BEL(S) = f#(K
as
);#(K
bs
)g
BL(S) =
Receive(A; fA B N
a
g)
Split(fA B N
a
g)
Generate-secret(K
ab
)
Send(A,Encrypt(Concat(N
a
; B 1 K
ab
;
Encrypt(A 1 K
ab
;K
bs
));K
as
))
Update(fN
a
B 1 K
ab
 fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
g
K
as
;W)
Once the protocol has been specied, the anal-
ysis begins. However, the analysis technique
described here can be used to test the protocol
as it is being developed.
The rst action in BL(A) is marked with a 
because A is the initiator of the protocol. For
each action, its condition is tested. If it does
not hold, the protocol analysis is aborted, and
the specication is infeasible. If the condition
holds, then the result is applied and the re-
quired sets are updated. Next, the inference
rules are examined to see if any apply. Finally,
the action is marked with a  to show that it
has been successful, and the mark, , is moved
to the next action.
Every Send action is followed by an Update
action. The Send action species to whom the
message is sent. After an Update action, the
mark moves to the rst Receive action with no
 of the principal identied in the correspond-
ing Send action.
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6.1.2 The Analysis
The rst four actions in BL(A) are executed
resulting in new members of the sets POSS(A)
and BEL(A). Also, the Update action causes
Observers(N
a
) =W. So far, no inference rules
can be applied.
POSS(A) = fK
as
; N
a
; fA B N
a
gg
BEL(A) = f#(K
as
);LINK(N
a
)g
BL(A) =
 Generate-nonce(N
a
)
 Concat(A;B;N
a
)
 Send(S; fA B N
a
g)
 Update(fA B N
a
g;W)
Receive(S; fN
a
B 1 K
ab
 fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
g
K
as
)
  
After the Update action, the next action to
be executed is in S's behavior list because the
Send action species S.
 Receive(A; fA B N
a
g)
The ve actions of BL(S) are executed. There
are still no relevant inference rules. The set
S now contains fK
as
;K
bs
;K
ab
g. After apply-
ing the Update function, Observers(K
ab
) =
fS;Ag because A 2 Observers(K
as
). The term
fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
does not cause B to be added
to the Observers set of K
ab
because B is not a
member of Observers(K
as
), and so B is not in
Observers(K
as
) \ Observers(K
bs
). The pos-
session set contains subparts of messages that
were built as the messages were constructed,
but we omit these here for space consideration
as they do not contribute in any way to the
analysis. The new values of S's local sets are:
POSS(S) = fK
as
;K
bs
; fA B N
a
g from A,
K
ab
; fN
a
B 1 K
ab
 fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
g
K
as
g
BEL(S) = f#(K
as
);#(K
bs
);#(K
ab
)g
BL(S) =
 Receive(A; fA B N
a
g)
 Split(fA B N
a
g)
 Generate-secret(K
ab
)
 Send(A,Encrypt(Concat(N
a
; B 1 K
ab
;
Encrypt(A 1 K
ab
;K
bs
));K
as
))
 Update(fN
a
B 1 K
ab
 fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
g
K
as
;W)
The next action is in A's BL.
 Receive(S; fN
a
B 1 K
ab
 fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
g
K
as
)
The term fN
a
 B 1 K
ab
 fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
g
K
as
is added to POSS(A). The next action to be
executed is:
 Decrypt(fN
a
B 1 K
ab
 fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
g
K
as
;K
as
)
This will add the term fN
a
 B 1 K
ab
 fA 1
K
ab
g
K
bs
g to POSS(A). The next action,
Split will add the individual components too.
At this point, the conditions for the linkage
rule are satised. We take X to be the term
fN
a
 B 1 K
ab
 fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
g that was just
added to POSS(A). The reader can verify that
the following are all true:
1. #(K
as
) 2 BEL(A)
2. A 2 Observers(K
as
)
3. LINK(N
a
) 2 BEL(A)
4. X contains g(N
a
), where g is the identity
function
5. fXg
K
as
from S 2 POSS(A)
Once the linkage rule is applied, the freshness
of each subpart of X is added to belief set of
A. Also, the LINK formula is removed from
the belief set so that the nonce N
a
cannot be
used again.
At this point, the global sets have not
changed. The sets for principal A are as fol-
lows (We omit items in the possession and be-
lief sets, such as large concatenated messages,
that serve no further purpose.):
Principal A
POSS(A) = fK
as
; N
a
; B 1 K
ab
; fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
g
BEL(A) = f#(K
as
);#(K
ab
);#(fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
)g
BL(A) =
 Generate-nonce(N
a
)
 Concat(A;B;N
a
)
 Send(S; fA B N
a
g)
 Update(fA B N
a
g;W)
 Receive(S; fN
a
B 1 K
ab
 fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
g
K
as
)
 Decrypt(fN
a
B 1 K
ab
 fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
g
K
as
;K
as
)
 Split(fN
a
B 1 K
ab
 fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
g)
 Send(B; fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
)
Update(fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
;W)
Receive(B; fN
b
g
K
ab
)
Decrypt(fN
b
g
K
ab
;K
ab
)
Send(B;Encrypt(Apply(f;N
b
);K
ab
))
Update(ff(N
b
)g
K
ab
;W)
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The Send and Update actions in A's behavior
list are executed next. The Update function
adds B to Observers(K
ab
). The next action to
be executed is in B's behavior list, as specied
by the last Send action.
 Receive(A; fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
)
The next action on B's behavior list is:
 Decrypt(fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
;K
bs
)
After this action is executed, fA 1 K
ab
g is
added to POSS(B). However, the linkage rule
does not apply because there is no LINK state-
ment in BEL(B). Thus, B cannot conclude
that K
ab
is fresh!
In fact, when B receives ff(N
b
)g
K
ab
from A,
it cannot apply the linkage rule because one of
the conditions is that K
ab
is fresh. For the re-
mainder of the protocol, B can never conclude
that anything received under K
ab
is fresh.
This is the same aw discovered in the Need-
ham and Schroeder protocol by Denning and
Sacco. [5] We apply Needham and Schroeder's
x [12] by adding several actions to the be-
ginning of the behavior lists of A and B. To
BL(A), we add the actions:
Send(B; fAg)
Update(fAg;W)
Receive(B; fA; Jg
K
bs
)
Decrypt(fA  Jg
K
bs
;K
bs
)
Split(fA  Jg)
And to BL(B), we add the actions:
Receive(A; fAg)
Generate-nonce(J)
Send(A; Encrypt(Concat(A; J);K
bs
))
Update(fA  Jg
K
bs
;W)
Then, A will include J in the original message
to S, and S will include it in fA 1 K
ab
g
K
bs
that gets forwarded to B.
It is clear that when B generates J , a LINK
statement is added to BEL(B). When B re-
ceives the message containing K
ab
from A, it
will be able to conclude #(K
ab
). Also, because
Observers(K
bs
) = fB; Sg throughout the pro-
tocol, no intruder could generate or modify the
forwarded message from A to B that is sealed
under K
bs
.
Thus, our analysis reveals no aws in the re-
vised Needham and Schroeder protocol.
6.2 KHAT
Our method for analyzing cryptographic pro-
tocols does not include temporal reasoning.
Thus, we specify and analyze the two phases
of the khat protocol separately.
One advantage of our method is that the khat
protocol can be specied in the same manner as
the Needham and Schroeder protocol; we spec-
ify all the global and local sets. The behavior
lists will contain actions that precisely describe
the protocol. Section 4 showed that the pre-
vious method of listing the messages between
principals is inadequate as a specication tech-
nique.
Our analysis reveals a signicant aw in the
khat protocol. We provide a x to the protocol,
and use the analysis to demonstrate that the
aw no longer exists.
6.2.1 The Specication
The khat protocol involves two principals: the
client (C) and the server (S). In this protocol,
the trust matrix must reect the fact that they
trust each other. The client trusts the server
to issue valid tickets, and the server trusts the
client to forget the information specied in the
protocol. If the TRUST[i; j], where i is the
server and j is the client, is not 1, then the
server will not believe that the client no longer
possesses information which should be forgot-
ten. Thus, a fundamental assumption of the
protocol is identied.
When phase I begins, we assume that a se-
cure channel has been established using the
Kerberos ticket for the khat service. Thus,
K is the session key between C and S, and
Observers(K) = fC; Sg. P = fS;Cg, C is
marked as the initiator, and S = fKg. In this
specication, SF represents the spool le for
the user's job. The local sets are now dened:
Client
POSS(C) = fKg
BEL(C) = f#(K)g
BL(C) =
 Generate-secret(SF )
Generate-secret(N )
Encrypt(K,N )
Send(S,Encrypt(Concat(SF;N );K))
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Update(fSF Ng
K
;W)
Forget-secret(N )
Forget-secret(SF )
4
Phase II
Receive(S; fN  fSF  TGT
C
g
K
g)
Split(fN  fSFg
K
g)
Decrypt(fKg
N
; N )
Decrypt(fSF  TGT
C
g
K
;K)
Split(fSF  TGT
C
g)
Check-Freshness(TGT
C
)
Server
POSS(S) = fKg
BEL(S) = f#(K)g
BL(S) =
Receive(C; fSF Ng
K
)
Decrypt(fSF Ng
K
;K)
Split(fSF Ng)
Phase II
Generate-secret(TGT
C
)
Send(Concat(N ,Encrypt(Concat(SF; TGT
C
);
K)))
Update(fN  fSF  TGT
C
g
K
g, W)
6.2.2 The Analysis
We begin our analysis with Phase I of the
protocol. After the analysis reaches the rst
Forget-secret statement, the local sets are
as follows (once again, for the sake of clarity,
we omit some encrypted items in the posses-
sion and belief sets that don't contribute to the
analysis):
Client
POSS(C) = fK;SF;N; fKg
N
; g
BEL(C) = f#(K);#(N );#(SF )g
BL(C) =
 Generate-secret(SF )
 Generate-secret(N )
 Encrypt(K,N )
 Send(S,Encrypt(Concat(SF;N );K))
 Update(fSF Ng
K
;W)
4
For completeness sake, we should also specify to
forget fSF Ng
K
and other formulas that are added to
POSS(C) by Concat and Encrypt, but we will omit
these from the BL for clarity. They would be in-
cluded in an actual specication (and their existance
helped the author discover a bug in the actual khat
implementation).
 Forget-secret(N )
Forget-secret(SF )
Server
POSS(S) = fK;N; SFg
BEL(S) = f#(K)g
BL(S) =
 Receive(C; fSF Ng
K
)
 Decrypt(fSF Ng
K
;K)
 Split(fSF Ng)
Notice that the server cannot conclude #(SF )
or #(N ). This is a serious aw because an in-
truder can use a replay attack for the remainder
of the session
5
to reschedule the user's job.
To solve this problem, we modify the proto-
col so that along with the khat ticket, the server
sends a list of fresh nonces to the client. Each
time the user schedules a job, he includes an
unused nonce in the message. In the analysis,
the server will have a collection of LINK state-
ments in its belief set, and the freshness of N
and SF can be guaranteed.
6.2.3 The Corrected Protocol
The corrected protocol is as follows:
Client
POSS(C) = fKg
BEL(C) = f#(K)g
BL(C) =
Part of ticket granting
Receive(S,fN
1
; N
2
;   N
n
g)
Split(fN
1
; N
2
;   N
n
g)
Phase I
Generate-secret(SF )
Generate-secret(N )
Encrypt(K,N )
Send(S,Encrypt(Concat(SF;N;N
i
6
);K))
Update(fSF N N
i
g
K
;W)
Forget-secret(N )
Forget-secret(SF )
Phase II
Receive(S; fN  fSF  TGT
C
g
K
g)
Split(fN  fSFg
K
g)
Decrypt(fKg
N
; N )
5
That is, the remaining lifetime of the khat ticket
from the ticket granting service.
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Decrypt(fSF  TGT
C
g
K
;K)
Split(fSF  TGT
C
g)
Check-freshness(TGT
C
)
Server
POSS(S) = fKg
BEL(S) = f#(K)g
BL(S) =
Part of ticket granting
 Generate-nonce(N
1
)
Generate-nonce(N
2
)
  
Generate-nonce(N
n
)
Send(C,Concat(N
1
; N
2
;    ; N
n
))
Update(fN
1
; N
2
;   N
n
g;W)
Phase I
Receive(C; fSF N N
i
g
K
)
Decrypt(fSF N N
i
g
K
;K)
Split(fSF N N
i
g)
Phase II
Generate-secret(TGT
C
)
Send(Concat(N ,Encrypt(Concat(SF; TGT
C
);
K)))
Update(fN  fSF  TGT
C
g
K
g;W)
Now, after the analysis reaches the rst
Forget-secret statement, BEL(S) contains
(among other things) #(K), LINK(N
2
);    ;
LINK(N
n
), #(SF ), and #(N ). The aw
described earlier no longer exists. If an in-
truder attempts to replay the message con-
taining the spool le, the server will recognize
that the nonce, N
i
has already been used. In
the analysis, this is reected by the absence
of LINK(N
1
) from BEL(S). The linkage rule
cannot be applied in this case. Thus, the server
will not conclude that the spool le in the re-
played message is fresh, and the protocol will
be aborted.
We continue our analysis with the client's ac-
tions:
 Forget-secret(N )
Forget-secret(SF )
After these actions, N and SF are removed
from POSS(C). Also, the beliefs that C pos-
sesses N and SF are removed fromBEL(S) be-
cause S trusts C according to the trust matrix.
6
N
i
is the rst unused nonce in the list received from
the server.
At this point phase I is over. It is clear from
the values of the Observers sets, which are up-
dated with every Send action, that nobody can
learn the value of SF from the messages sent.
Also, the possession set of C represents what an
intruder can learn by compromising the work-
station while a job is pending. The only use-
ful possession is fKg
N
. Of course, without N ,
this is useless. Because Observers(N ) = fSg,
no intruder can gain anything by compromising
the workstation before phase II begins.
To preserve space, we include only the most
interesting part of the analysis that remains.
When phase II begins, the next three actions
are the server's.
 Generate-secret(TGT
C
)
Send(Concat(N ,Encrypt(Concat(SF; TGT
C
);K)))
Update(fN  fSF  TGT
C
g
K
g;W)
After the Update action, Observers(N ) = W.
Thus, if an intruder has compromised the work-
station and obtained fKg
N
, then the secrecy
of K has also been lost. Thus, analysis reveals
that once it is time for the job to run, a pre-
vious compromise of the workstation results in
an insecure session key. This further results in
the compromise of the TGT .
Our analysis reveals a new vulnerability in
phase II of khat. Although the analysis did
not mechanically produce this result, use of our
technique generated conclusions from which
the vulnerability became apparent. In Section
7 we discuss how to test a protocol for known
weaknesses.
6.3 Nessett criticism
In his well known note [13], Nessett criticizes
the BAN logic. He presents the following pro-
tocol that uses assymetric keys:
A! B : fN
a
;K
ab
g
K
a
 1
B ! A : fN
b
g
K
ab
The problem is that K
ab
is encrypted under A's
private key. Thus, anyone intercepting the rst
message can decrypt it with the corresponding
public key and obtain the session key.
Although the inference rules needed for pub-
lic keys are not included in this paper, it is a
simple matter to construct them. The global
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set R of inference rules was intentionally left
for the user to specify to provide ways of ex-
tending the analysis.
Once the protocol is specied, our analy-
sis immediately reveals the aw. After the
rst message is sent, the update function sets
Observers(K
ab
) to W because the Observers
set of the public key K
a
is W. In addition, B
does not believe that K
ab
is fresh.
Interestingly, our analysis also reveals that in
addition to its obvious and intended aw, the
Nessett protocol uses nonces improperly.
7 Analyzing Known
Threats
Our specication and analysis technique can
also be used to test a protocol against a known
attack. This can be done by including the in-
truder, Z, in the set of principals. BL(Z) con-
tains the actions that the intruder performs.
The analysis determines what Z is able to learn
during the course of the protocol. The trust
matrix can even be used to analyze what hap-
pens when Z is actually trusted.
By specifying BL(Z) dierently, one can de-
termine whether an intruder could trick a par-
ticipant into revealing some sensitive informa-
tion using a given attack. In this sense, a user
can interact with the analysis to check a new
protocol for given aws and vulnerabilities.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce a new method for
specifying authentication protocols that oers
several advantages over existing methods. The
method also includes a logical analysis based
on the propagation of belief and knowledge. A
fundamental assumption in our threat model is
that any message in the system is essentially a
broadcast.
We specify protocols as a collection of inde-
pendent processes. This model closely resem-
bles the structure of the actual distributed sys-
tem in which the protocols are implemented.
Our specications are designed to resemble the
actual implementation as much as possible.
This eliminates aws introduced in the process
of converting a specication (which may con-
tain no aws itself) to an actual program.
One weakness of many analysis techniques
that require protocol idealization is that aws
in the protocol may not appear in the ideal-
ized version. Thus, the analysis is incapable of
revealing them. Our method does not require
idealization and thus avoids this problem.
We demonstrate that our method can be
used to reason about a new class of proto-
cols for which previous approaches are inad-
equate. We use actions such as Forget and
Forget-secret along with knowledge and be-
lief sets to reason about nonmonotonicity of
knowledge in protocols.
The Needham and Schroeder protocol has
become a benchmark used by designers of anal-
ysis techniques to test their methods. We
demonstrate how the known aw in that proto-
col is revealed. In addition, we use our method
to uncover a new aw in our khat protocol and
to discover a vulnerability in phase II of the
protocol. Finally, we show that our method
easily uncovers aws in protocols, such as Nes-
sett's, that methods such as BAN cannot de-
tect.
9 Future Work
The method presented in this paper has been
successful to the extent that it discovered a new
aw in the khat protocol and also revealed an
unknown vulnerability. The analysis would be
even better if we could make some claim about
the soundness and completeness of the reason-
ing. One possible way to do this is to dene the
semantics of the logic. However, it is not clear
that these properties hold, and useful seman-
tics of logics of authentication are extremely
rare because of the diculty of dening them.
We would like to use the techniques we have
developed to specify and analyze other proto-
cols as well as the ones presented here. In par-
ticular, the ability to specify and analyze proto-
cols with nonmonotonicity of knowledge opens
the door to a whole new class of protocols. One
possible application of this method involves an-
alyzing aspects of public key systems, which
rely on forgetting some large primes, in a new
way. Previous approaches take for granted that
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when a principal generates a key, it discards the
pieces necessary to reconstruct it. Our method
gives a user the exibility to analyze the system
at a ner granularity.
It is our hope that methods such as the one
we present in this paper will help in the devel-
opment of protocols with higher assurance of
security.
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